Vulnerability: Attackers abused ScreenConnect management access to deploy rogue clients. Researchers also identified an authentication weakness in third-party RMM+ extensions.
Exploitation: Huntress observed 288 affected endpoints across 48 organizations on November 11.
Available fixes: ConnectWise disabled five third-party extensions where possible. Technician client version 26.6.5 or later blocks the toolkit’s identified endpoint-to-technician spread technique.
Enterprise response: MSPs should investigate unauthorized clients, secure management access, and use independent endpoint tools for containment.
The ScreenConnect MSP attack rogue clients campaign exposed hundreds of customer endpoints to unauthorized remote access through compromised managed service provider (MSP) environments. On November 11, 2026, attackers abused ScreenConnect’s Run Command functionality to distribute rogue clients and additional tooling.
Security firm Huntress identified at least 288 affected endpoints across 48 organizations, with deployments occurring within approximately 90 minutes. ConnectWise subsequently disabled five third-party extensions across roughly 400 partner environments as a precaution.
The incident highlights how compromised remote-management access can expose multiple customer environments and complicate endpoint investigation.
How did the ScreenConnect attack unfold?
Attackers gained unauthorized access to ScreenConnect environments and used legitimate remote-management functionality to distribute malicious software.
According to Huntress’s investigation, suspicious activity began around 17:47 UTC on November 11.
November 11, 17:47 UTC: Huntress detected suspicious Run Command activity across multiple environments.
Within 90 minutes: Attackers deployed rogue clients and additional tooling across 288 endpoints belonging to 48 organizations.
November 11, 22:45 UTC: ConnectWise issued its initial advisory and announced precautionary extension disabling.
November 12: ConnectWise published additional findings concerning third-party extension weaknesses and protection against attempted propagation.
ConnectWise reported no evidence that its own infrastructure was compromised. The initial access method remained under investigation.
Cybersecurity essentials for any organization
Explore essential cybersecurity practices to protect data, endpoints, and networks.
How attackers deployed rogue ScreenConnect clients
The campaign exploited trusted management functionality to install attacker-controlled remote-access clients on customer endpoints.
Unauthorized command execution and persistence
Attackers used ScreenConnect’s Run Command feature to execute commands on managed Windows devices. These commands installed additional ScreenConnect clients connected to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Researchers also identified a toolkit calledSCKit, containing PowerShell scripts, batch files, and other components. The toolkit established persistence through a scheduled task named TrapWatch and components underC:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\, which were designed to replace the legitimate ScreenConnect client’s active connection with an attacker-controlled component.
Attempted propagation through technician sessions
SCKit was designed to intercept technician sessions, access authentication cookies, and attempt further payload distribution through ScreenConnect’s shared Toolbox functionality.
However, Huntress had not observed successful propagation from infected endpoints to technician workstations or additional devices through this mechanism.
ConnectWise confirmed that ScreenConnect client version 26.6.5 blocks the identified propagation technique.
Third-party extension exposure
Researchers identified an authentication weakness affecting RMM+ versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 when administrators had not configured an access key.
ConnectWise disabled five third-party extensions in partner environments where it could take action and instructed on-premises partners to disable them manually:
Third-party extension
Action
Labtech Plus
Precautionary disabling
RMM Plus
Precautionary disabling
RMM+
Precautionary disabling
RMM Plus Password Link
Precautionary disabling
RMM+ Password Link
Precautionary disabling
Approximately 400 partner environments had at least one identified extension installed. The presence of these extensions does not confirm that attackers compromised those environments.
Why the ScreenConnect MSP attack rogue clients campaign matters
The campaign demonstrates how unauthorized management access can expose multiple customer environments through a trusted MSP platform.
Key enterprise risks include:
Loss of management visibility: Attacker-controlled clients can create remote-access channels that operate outside the MSP’s approved management workflows.
Endpoint persistence: Scheduled tasks and additional clients can preserve unauthorized access.
Technician exposure: Session interception and attempted propagation create risks for administrators connecting to affected devices.
Sequential attacker-assigned identifiers also suggest potentially earlier activity, although additional compromises remain unconfirmed.
What should MSPs do to contain the attack?
Organizations should prioritize securing ScreenConnect access and independently verifying affected endpoints.
Secure management access: Keep affected extensions disabled, terminate active ScreenConnect sessions, rotate potentially exposed credentials, revoke affected browser and identity-provider sessions, and review administrator permissions.
Update technician clients: Verify ScreenConnect client version 26.6.5 or later on technician workstations.
Review activity: Investigate authentication records, Run Command history, extension installations, and Toolbox activity.
Check published indicators: Look for rogue client IDs 2588ef5c15954b10 and ed630cc2c873b091, the TrapWatch task, and the RelayTrap directory.
Contain affected endpoints: Avoid ScreenConnect sessions with suspected infected devices. Use independent tools to isolate systems, preserve evidence, remove rogue clients and persistence mechanisms, and monitor for reinfection before restoring access.
Follow ConnectWise’s official advisories for updated investigation and remediation guidance.
Featured resource
The Cybersecurity Blueprint
Explore essential cybersecurity strategies, frameworks, statistics, and implementation steps to strengthen your organization's security posture.
Investigate remotely: Use Remote Terminal for administrator-led checks.
Hexnode XDR does not automatically detect this campaign, secure ScreenConnect accounts, or replace vendor remediation. Administrators must independently verify suspicious activity and successful cleanup.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can MSPs investigate compromised endpoints without using ScreenConnect?
Yes. MSPs can use independently deployed endpoint security tools to investigate affected systems without relying on potentially compromised ScreenConnect sessions. These tools can support endpoint isolation, process investigation, and remote administrative access.
Was the attack caused by a ScreenConnect zero-day?
ConnectWise reported no evidence of a ScreenConnect platform vulnerability being exploited for initial access. Researchers identified a separate weakness in third-party RMM+ extensions.
Does disabling the extensions remove rogue clients?
No. Disabling extensions does not remove previously installed malicious clients or persistence mechanisms. Affected endpoints require separate investigation and remediation.
Conclusion
The ScreenConnect MSP attack rogue clients campaign highlights the risks of relying on a single remote-management platform across multiple customer environments.
For MSPs, the broader lesson is to maintain independent security visibility and response capabilities. Separating endpoint containment from routine remote administration helps preserve investigation options when trusted management infrastructure becomes part of an incident.
Maintain Independent Endpoint Security Visibility
Strengthen investigation and containment when trusted remote-management tools become compromised.
A storyteller for practical people. Breaks down complicated topics into steps, trade-offs, and clear next actions—without the buzzword fog. Known to replace fluff with facts, sharpen the message, and keep things readable—politely.